The Road To Baghdad - Continue The Attack!

By: Daniel J. Gilbert

Narrated by: Virtual Voice

In March 1991, three days after signing a cease-fire ending Operation Desert Storm, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was beginning to feel “suckered” by the Iraqis. That same day, planning began to seize Baghdad and to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
Schwarzkopf’s superiors in Washington were frustrated by the Iraqis’ recalcitrance in complying with the United Nations resolutions that governed the cessation of hostilities. Yet at the same time, the American people were stunned and jubilant over the outcome of the 100-hour land campaign and had been told the troops would come home as quickly as possible. That day, March 6, 1991, Schwarzkopf gave Lieutenant General John Yeosock, head of the Army component of U.S. Central Command, and his chief planner, Major General Steven Arnold, a set of demanding orders: Prepare to pull out of Iraq rapidly, but in the meantime, don’t give up an inch of occupied territory. Leave the “minimum essential force” in place, Schwarzkopf told them.
But, they wondered, “minimum essential force” for what?
To the two generals, it appeared as if Desert Storm had not run its course and U.S. ground troops might have to move against Baghdad and bring down Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. The euphoria of victory had been replaced by the hard realization that the job was far from finished. With the signatures on the cease-fire barely dry, the Iraqis turned truculent about every aspect of the agreement. Unless Saddam and his henchmen were eliminated from power, the battlefield victory might not be secured.
There have been a number of critics following what has become to be called the “First Gulf War”, who lamented that the U.S. Army (and perhaps the coalition) should have been allowed to “finish the job” by moving on Baghdad, capturing or killing Saddam Hussein, removing the Ba'athist Regime members from power, occupying Iraq and installing a new Iraqi government. This book explores these notions that the George H. W. Bush (41st United States President) Administration did not finish the job at the time. Some critics have even gone so far as to accuse senior U.S. military officers and in particular U.S. Army General officers as having “no appetite” to continue the attack to Baghdad.
The opening chapter of this book is non-fiction and is based upon historical research, historical facts and the author’s own personal experiences. Initial planning for a little known and at the time, highly classified contingency plan called “The Road To Baghdad” had begun in early March 1991. This plan was never finalized or executed. But what if it had been? Most of this book is fiction as it examines what might have happened had the plan been carried out and US Army Central Command marched on Baghdad to capture or kill Saddam Hussein and remove his Ba’athist regime from power.
Follow the soldiers of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Armor Division, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as they “Continue The Attack” on “The Road To Baghdad!” Ride with them in their Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Abrams Tanks, and Assault Helicopters as they fight their way across the Euphrates River, encircle Baghdad, and seize the Baghdad International Airport. Accompany Rangers from the 1st Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment as they conduct special operations in Baghdad to capture or kill Saddam Hussein and members of his Ba’athist regime. It didn’t happen in 1991, but it could have.